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Foreword
This report is the second in a series of three country case studies that were undertaken as part of The
North-South Institute’s project on Poverty and Policy Coherence. The first study on Mali was
released in November 2000 and a third study on Jamaica should be released shortly, along with a
final synthesis report.
The issue of policy coherence has become part of the international dialogue about development
cooperation in recent years. Donors now realize that the effectiveness of their aid efforts can be seri-
ously undermined by policies in other areas such as trade, finance and immigration. Conversely,
trade and other policies that take into account developing countries’ needs are essential to comple-
ment efforts being made by aid agencies and their partners in developing countries.
The aim of the three case studies is to provide country-specific illustrations of how Canadian aid and
non-aid policies towards developing countries interact in practice. They also consider how Canadian
policies interact with the poverty reduction policies of both the recipient government and other
development actors operating in that country. 
We expect the findings will contribute to the ongoing discussion about Canada’s relations with
developing countries. The Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) latest document
on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness (June 2001) outlines a number of ways to achieve greater policy
coherence, many of which resonate with our own proposals. For instance, CIDA suggests (p. 41)
“Canada should review the impact of its policies on developing countries and assess opportunities to
improve their overall development coherence.” 
In this spirit, our study argues that CIDA should work with the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade to ensure that Canada’s positions in the new round of global trade negotiations
address the development objectives of countries like Bangladesh. In fact, CIDA has already begun to
enhance its knowledge of trade and other policy areas, which should allow it to participate more
effectively in interdepartmental discussions of Canadian policies that affect developing countries.
CIDA is also considering changes in its own policies and procedures that should lead to greater pol-
icy coherence. One proposal is to strengthen CIDA’s field presence, which in turn would allow the
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delegation of more decisions to the field. This would also allow the design of Canadian country pro-
gramming to be informed more from the field and to promote coherence between Canadian aid and
the programming of recipients and other donors. Such an approach would begin to respond to the
criticism, in this report, of CIDA’s centralizing tendencies in spite of its support in principle of par-
ticipation and local ownership.  
I would like to take this opportunity to thank CIDA and the International Development Research
Centre for funding this study, as well as our research partners for their dedication to this project, and
the many people who shared their views with us in the course of our investigations in Bangladesh,
Jamaica, Mali and Canada.
Ann Weston
Vice-President and Research Coordinator
The North-South Institute
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This study of the coherence of Canadian policies toward Bangladesh is one of three country case
studies undertaken as part of The North-South Institute’s project on Poverty and Policy Coherence,
the others being Mali and Jamaica. It draws on an extensive series of interviews conducted in
Bangladesh in May 1999 as well as interviews in Canada throughout 1999 and a review of documents
collected in both countries. The results of earlier drafts were shared with selected interviewees for
validation in early 2000.
As a country with persistent problems of extreme poverty, Bangladesh has been a major Canadian aid
recipient for several years. Recently, the policy framework for the Canadian International
Development Agency’s (CIDA) programming in Bangladesh has focused on two priority areas—basic
human needs and good governance. Besides the more traditional emphasis on capacity-building
among NGOs and the private sector, governance has been defined by CIDA to include economic
management and increased accountability and efficiency of government institutions.
A key thread running throughout this report is the extent to which the emphasis on reform of eco-
nomic policies, to liberalize Bangladesh’s markets inter alia, will assist in poverty reduction. One con-
cern raised is that the pursuit of a neo-liberal agenda, in an attempt to help Bangladesh maximize
economic growth, may detract from, if not actually undermine, other efforts to reduce poverty. It
may also exacerbate the already widening inequalities, particularly between the rural and urban areas.  
Certainly for the Government of Bangladesh, accelerated economic growth is a key objective for the
Fifth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002), in a bid to reduce rural poverty through increased farm and non-
farm production and employment, along with more equitable distribution of opportunities and a
range of social development and other goals. The government has adopted a two-prong strategy
emphasizing the development of human resources (e.g., through education) and economic opportu-
nities for the poor (e.g., through food production).   
CIDA programs have targeted the reduction of poverty, especially among poor women (e.g., through
road maintenance and micro-credit). Key areas of development activity include food production, pri-
mary health care and family planning, literacy and primary education, income-generating activities,
water management, agriculture and the environment and infrastructure services. These initiatives
have involved collaboration with Bangladesh government-sponsored programs as well as actively
sponsoring a few major NGOs, and a large number of smaller NGOs through the local Canada
Fund.  
For its part, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has clear interests
in Bangladesh’s economic reforms, although it does not have a defined strategy for Bangladesh. Its
focus has been somewhat narrow, promoting particular Canadian exports and investments. To the
extent that DFAIT is interested in CIDA’s aid programming, it has been through the implications for
more immediate Canadian commercial interests. There is little indication that DFAIT believes a
stronger poverty reduction strategy would lead to a more promising market for the Canadian private
sector in the medium- to long-term. 
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The report argues strongly in favour of greater collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT, while rec-
ognizing that there are certain risks, namely further imbuing CIDA programming with Canadian
commercial interests. According to the authors, there is scope for CIDA to ensure that market
reforms in Bangladesh—and expansion of Canadian business activity there—are pro-poor. It is
suggested that CIDA work with DFAIT, and other development partners, to design an integrated
country strategy. This would address ways of ensuring that DFAIT complements CIDA’s work on
governance and poverty reduction. For instance, DFAIT could play an active role in promoting trade
policies in Canada and other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which are more
sensitive to the development needs of Bangladesh (and other least-developed countries). Certainly, a
prime example of policy incoherence is Canada’s continued resistance to remove all tariffs on imports
from Bangladesh (and other least-developed countries) and the slow pace of liberalization of its
clothing market for these countries.
With respect to the relations between CIDA headquarters and the field office in Dhaka, the report
notes strong centralizing tendencies, despite CIDA’s support for participation and local ownership.
This was underlined by the way in which the Country Programming Framework (CPF) was
designed in 1997. Such an approach makes it difficult to promote coherence between CIDA’s policies
and those of the Bangladesh government and its local development partners.
On collaboration between CIDA and other actors in the development of Bangladesh, the report
finds that there is regular consultation in Ottawa on policies and programming with NGOs and exe-
cuting agencies. But it does not appear that these go beyond an exchange of information to accepting
inputs on policy design.  
Despite aid cuts, which have reduced Canada to the rank of eleventh among donors to Bangladesh,
Canada plays an active role in the donor coordination mechanisms in the country, notably through
its leadership of two sub-groups on micro-finance and NGOs, within the World Bank-led Local
Consultation Group. Canada is also actively involved in the Like-Minded Group.  
Canada’s relations with the Government of Bangladesh are good, with most aid being coordinated
through the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of Finance. Yet the research found that
there was scope for improvement, particularly with respect to creating more space for Bangladeshi
officials to play a role in project design as well as management.  
With respect to Bangladeshi NGOs, the report raises questions about CIDA’s policies toward smaller
NGOs, noting its continued concentration on a few larger and well-established NGOs. On the issue
of policy coherence, it notes a lack of consultation with even these larger NGOs in the design of the
country programming framework, in contrast to the practices of other donors, such as the UK
Department for International Development, which meet with different local socio-political groups
prior to the formulation of their country strategy for Bangladesh. 
To strive for greater coherence, with a view to having a greater impact on Bangladesh’s poverty
reduction efforts, the report makes the following recommendations:
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1. That Canada consider the adoption of an integrated Canadian approach to Bangladesh by com-
bining CIDA’s CPF and DFAIT’s policies and programs toward Bangladesh. It would be particu-
larly useful for DFAIT to take a special interest in complementing the goals of Canadian
development cooperation in Bangladesh, which remains the critical focal point of Canada’s rela-
tionship with Bangladesh. Such an integrated approach to Bangladesh’s poverty reduction and
development should be underpinned by the development of an institutional mechanism for
enhanced collaboration between the activities of DFAIT and CIDA. 
2. That CIDA and DFAIT should jointly establish consultative bodies and/or advisory committees
both in Ottawa and in Dhaka to increase consultation and collaboration with NGOs, civil society
groups, and businesses. These consultative bodies would meet several times a year, as needed:
• to share and disseminate information 
• to produce analyses of major economic, social and political trends in Bangladesh and South
Asia 
• to promote coordinated action between the relevant Canadian government departments and
non-governmental organizations 
• to identify and assess inconsistencies between their programs, policies and preferences
• to put forward recommendations in order to achieve greater policy coherence.
3. That CIDA consider allowing its field officials increased autonomy (and decision-making
authority) to design and implement programs to meet Bangladesh’s crucial development chal-
lenges and to respond effectively and quickly to local needs and priorities. In addition, all con-
sultants working on CIDA projects should be made accountable to the Dhaka office, which
would monitor their work, based on the guidelines set by headquarters.  
4. That CIDA increase its efforts to appreciate the diversity of the NGO community, which has
experienced phenomenal growth in Bangladesh in the last two decades, as this has broader sig-
nificance for CIDA’s development initiatives. In particular, CIDA needs to distinguish between
intermediary NGOs that serve the interests of the government and/or a particular political party
and those which strive to advance the genuine cause of development. 
5. That CIDA make a special effort to enhance the involvement of its local partners, including the
Government of Bangladesh and indigenous NGOs, in designing and implementing development
programs. Such an initiative may enable its non-Canadian development partners to play a more
active role in realizing the vision of sustainable human development. 
6. That DFAIT consider the adoption of a well-defined, mutually beneficial trade and investment
policy for Bangladesh, with inputs from both CIDA and other actors in Bangladesh. Such a pol-
icy not only would enable Canadian companies to take advantage of Bangladesh’s increasingly
liberalized trade and investment regimes, but also it would help Bangladeshi business actors to
find a more secure place in the Canadian market. The expansion of Canada’s business ties with





Objectives of the study
This country case study examines the nature of Canada’s aid and non-aid relationships with
Bangladesh. As part of the larger project on policy coherence sponsored by The North-South
Institute (NSI), it analyzes the complex process of both formulating and implementing policies and
programs, involving various Canadian organizations—governmental and non-governmental, that
directly or indirectly affect the poverty situation in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh incidences of both
“moderate” and “extreme” poverty remain very high despite the efforts of various international bod-
ies to help the poor escape the poverty trap.  
The study aims to provide an empirical base to analyze how Canadian aid and non-aid policies and
programs are both formulated and implemented in Bangladesh. It examines in brief the ways in
which Canadian policies and programs are affecting Bangladesh’s poverty situation. In so doing, it
looks at the compatibility of Canadian development and foreign policy objectives toward
Bangladesh. The focus is on the following key questions: 
• How consistent are Canadian foreign policy objectives with the goals of Canadian development
cooperation in Bangladesh? In other words, to what extent do Canada’s broad foreign policy
goals complement its development objectives in Bangladesh?
• How are Canadian policies linked to the broader framework for international development
cooperation? More specifically, to what extent are Canadian policies intended to facilitate devel-
opment cooperation among the donor community? 
• To what extent do Canadian aid and non-aid policies assist Bangladeshi organizations in achiev-
ing the goals of poverty reduction?  
In brief, the study seeks to improve coherence of Canada’s aid and non-aid policies toward
Bangladesh. 
Methodology
Data and relevant materials were collected for this study through a survey of documents, field visits
and individual interviews. A great deal of information and empirical evidence were obtained from
published/unpublished records, books, periodicals and documents of both government and non-gov-
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ernmental agencies, largely by using various libraries in Ottawa and Dhaka. Moreover, “informal”
interviews were conducted with a variety of individuals to collect reliable and factual information
pertinent to this study. The respondents included officials from the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT), both at the headquarters and the field level, executives from Canadian and Bangladeshi
NGOs, relevant business representatives, Bangladeshi government officials and representatives of
key donor agencies, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (see Table 1). Relying upon
“unstructured open questionnaires”, we introduced topics of relevance so that the respondents could
voice freely their own “informed” views, comments and concerns.1 The findings of this report draw
upon the opinions, experiences, assessments and judgments of the respondents, as shared with us
during informal interviews in both Ottawa and Dhaka.
Table 1: Distribution of respondents by organizational affiliation
Organizational affiliation of respondents No. of representatives interviewed
• CIDA 11a
• DFAIT 5a
• Canadian CSOsb 3
• Canadian entrepreneurs 3
• Donor representatives in Bangladesh 7
• Government of Bangladesh 12
• Bangladeshi CSOsa 11
• Bangladeshi entrepreneurs 6
Total 58
a These numbers do not include the individuals that we met as a group.  
b Refers to civil society organizations, mainly development NGOs.
Limitations of the study
This report is based on the findings of the research conducted between April and June 1999. It is
expected that the findings of this study will enable various Canadian organizations, both governmen-
tal and non-governmental, to develop and/or strengthen mechanisms for ensuring greater coher-
ence, and thus to enhance their impact on poverty reduction in Bangladesh. However, the study does
not elaborate the details of a broader coherence framework that might be used to ensure more effec-
tive collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT, as this would require further research on the subject.
Nor does it make any effort to “evaluate” the overall impact of the programs and policies of CIDA
and DFAIT on Bangladesh’s poverty conditions. In other words, this study is not an assessment of
how Canadian aid and non-aid policies affect the welfare of different groups and households in
Bangladesh.2
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Structure of the report
This report is comprised of six major sections. Section 1 addresses some methodological and concep-
tual issues, such as the objectives of this study, research methodology and the definition of “policy
coherence”. The second section provides a brief account of Bangladesh’s socio-economic realities. It
begins by outlining some of the major macroeconomic issues of the country. It then looks briefly at
Bangladesh’s current political trends. The section also provides a summarized version of develop-
ment goals and priorities, as outlined by the Government of Bangladesh. 
Section 3 summarizes the history of Canadian development assistance to Bangladesh, starting from
1971. The fourth section analyzes various types of coherence based on the findings of our field work.
Section 5 presents a few concluding remarks and the final section provides some policy recommen-
dations for enhancing coherence between various relevant organizations. 
Conceptualizing policy coherence
The concept of “policy coherence” and/or “coordination” has been a subject of growing debate
among the donor community, development activists and social scientists. However, like many other
concepts in the social sciences, such a term and/or notion is used for a variety of different, often con-
tradictory, meanings. The dominant view focuses on the importance of minimizing inconsistencies in
policies adopted by different donor organizations and/or countries so that developing countries can
be integrated into global mainstream socio-economic activities.3 In contrast, more critical authors
suggest that improving coherence is essential to both the reduction of poverty and the advancement
of development at the grassroots in the 21st century.4
Important to mention is that, although “policy coherence” is not a new concept, making reference to
this term has become a recent fashion among development practitioners and academics. The interest
of both scholars and policy-makers in promoting “coherence” stems largely from three somewhat
interrelated factors. First of all, the emerging need to reduce and/or minimize conflicts between aid
and non-aid policies has encouraged policy-makers, academics and activists to develop frameworks
designed to ensure greater coherence between aid and non-aid policies, mainly trade and investment
policies.5 Given the ongoing processes of internationalization and transnationalization of production
and finance, most donors have begun to use aid to foster trade and productive investment opportuni-
ties in various parts of the world. Although such a shift in aid policies has enabled market forces,
both national and transnational, to organize production beyond national territories, this trend has
caused major concerns about the future of poverty reduction efforts. Some analysts have begun to
argue that donors’ growing interest in promoting trade and investment actually has impeded the
process of improving the human condition, which still remains the main objective of development
assistance. Donors, therefore, are urged to focus on the issue of policy coherence in order to mini-
mize inconsistencies between their aid and non-aid policies. 
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Secondly, the triumph of neo-liberalism in the contemporary global political economy not only calls
for the adoption of new definitions of both development and poverty, but also outlines the impor-
tance of giving more attention to long-term developmental goals, such as higher economic growth,
investment and human development, rather than making short-term advancements in poverty reduc-
tion. At the heart of this emerging development discourse is the belief that the success of poverty
reduction efforts will depend largely upon the ability of developing countries to ensure higher eco-
nomic growth. Without further growth, according to an annual report published by the UNDP,
short-term progress in poverty reduction and/or human development will not be sustainable.6 What
developing countries must do therefore, the report suggests, is to adopt policies that will allow them
to achieve rapid economic growth, enabling them to reduce significantly the sufferings of the poor.
Instead of looking for a “band-aid” solution, these countries are expected to make efforts to create
what the World Bank calls “an enabling environment for growth” largely through the use of official
development assistance.7
Such initiatives are believed to eventually expand productive employment opportunities for margin-
alized groups, namely the rural poor, women and peasants, hence helping poverty-ridden countries
to achieve the goals of social development. However, most analysts claim that these growth-oriented
development programs and policies can reduce human deprivation only if supported by a coherent
framework as there is no guarantee that the benefits of growth will automatically trickle down to the
poorest of the poor. In other words, without putting an institutional mechanism for promoting
coherence in place, developing countries may not be able to succeed in minimizing conflicts between
economic growth and development. 
Thirdly, increasing pressures from civil society groups, including advocacy NGOs working at differ-
ent levels, also create the need for donors to promote coherence between development and non-
development objectives of their policies and programs for the developing world. 
It is often argued that NGOs and civil society groups seek greater policy coherence primarily
because they strive to enhance the effectiveness of aid in achieving major developmental goals,
namely the reduction of poverty and the empowerment of the poor.8 Their interest in coherence lies
in the rationale that a commitment to greater policy coherence minimizes the negative effects of aid
and non-aid policies on the lives of the poor. Besides, coherence is a major concern for civil society
groups simply because it may widen the opportunity for them to be engaged more effectively in pol-
icy dialogues with donors. They hope that, by preventing or minimizing policy incoherence, donors,
governments of the developing world and civil society organizations can actually launch a successful
assault on global poverty.
Since a review of these debates is beyond the scope of this project, the study subscribes to the definition
of “coherence” by the European Union as “a process of reducing contradictions and/or inconsistencies
between various aspects of policies adopted by a variety of relevant government and non-government
organizations”9. This study takes the issue of coherence beyond the public domain, suggesting that
pro-poor policies are often made through the reconciliation of differing objectives of different gov-
ernment and non-government organizations. As well, it cautiously suggests that greater policy coher-
ence is a difficult, if not impossible, task to accomplish largely because such a process of eliminating
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inconsistencies requires the involvement of groups and organizations in decision-making, any of
which may hold conflicting views, ideas, and visions on both poverty and development.   
For the purpose of this project, the study will examine the following six major aspects of policy
coherence within the context of Canada’s relationships with Bangladesh:
• Coherence between Canadian government organizations, particularly between CIDA and
DFAIT
• Coherence between Canadian government and non-state organizations, including NGOs and
businesses
• Coherence within CIDA, particularly between the CIDA headquarters and the field office
• Coherence between Canada and major donor organizations/countries
• Coherence between Canadian and Bangladeshi government organizations




Bangladesh: Development realities in the 1990s
Macroeconomic context
Recent data suggests that Bangladesh has made some moderate progress in establishing a more stable
macroeconomic framework over the past few years. It has been able to contain both inflationary and
balance-of-payments pressures through the implementation of a World Bank-sponsored structural
adjustment program. The overall fiscal deficit has fallen sharply, as seen in Table 2, from 9.9 per cent
in fiscal year (FY) 1980 to 5.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in FY1999. Similarly, as
shown in Table 3, the inflation rate dropped from 18.9 per cent in FY 1980 to just 9.6 per cent in
FY1999. Thus, while much of the developing world struggled to attain the goals of the international
financial institutions’ stabilization programs, Bangladesh registered some tangible success in improv-
ing its macroeconomic balance, which is seen as crucial to the country’s search for higher economic
growth and human development.10
As shown in Table 2, the decline in the fiscal deficit reflects an increase in government revenues,
from 8.8 per cent of GDP in FY1985 to 11.9 per cent in FY1999. Also, there has been some progress
in such areas as current expenditures, investment and domestic savings. For instance, domestic sav-
ings increased from 2.3 per cent of GDP in FY1985 to 8.5 per cent in FY1999 (Table 3).
Table 2: Revenues and deficits (per cent of GDP)
FY80 FY85 FY90 FY95 FY98 FY99
Total revenue n/a 8.8 9.3 12.1 12.2 11.9
Tax revenue 7.3 6.9 7.8 9.6 9.9 9.5
Fiscal deficit -9.9 -7.4 -7.9 -6.8 -5.2 -5.3




Table 3: Inflation, investment, domestic savings and exchange notes
FY80 FY85 FY90 FY95 FY99
Rate of inflation
18.85 11.20 9.33 4.07 9.61
(% change in CPI)
Investment
15.29 12.94 12.8 16.63 17.28
(% GDP)
Domestic savings
2.25 2.33 2.72 8.31 8.45
(% GDP)
Exchange rate
15.47 26.06 32.93 40.20 50.80
(Taka/US$)
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and Government of Bangladesh, The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002).
Likewise, the level of investment rose from 12.9 per cent of GDP in FY1985 to 17.3 per cent in
FY1999. During this period, Bangladesh has made efforts to improve its balance-of-payments.
Higher growth of both exports and overseas workers’ remittances coupled with a visible decline in
imports in the early 1990s helped the country to restrain the current account deficit.11 According to
data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the current account deficit dropped from 3.2 per
cent of GDP in 1985 to 0.8 per cent in 1999. The overall balance-of-payments deficit, however,
improved marginally from 0.6 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GDP in the same period.12
Despite these moves toward stabilizing the economy, the country’s hope of meeting its myriad devel-
opmental challenges through market-oriented reforms has been frustrated largely by slow economic
growth. Throughout the 1980s, the economy grew by an estimated four per cent annually, much
lower than the seven to eight per cent required for reducing mass poverty. After a decade of virtual
stagnation, the economy showed signs of taking off, when GDP growth surprisingly reached 6.6 per
cent in FY1990.13 Unfortunately, the growth rate fell to 3.4 per cent in the next financial year, and
for the 1990-98 period, the average growth rate was 4.8 per cent annually.14 In other words, macro-
economic improvements did not lead to the attainment of significantly higher levels of GDP growth.  
Poverty and human development
Slow GDP growth has had serious implications for human development in general, and poverty alle-
viation in particular. Although donor-sponsored studies show that the poverty situation improved
somewhat in the 1980s, the slow economic growth did very little to alleviate absolute poverty.
Indeed, most studies suggest that both rural and urban poverty increased during this period.15 Such a
trend remained largely unchanged until the first few years of the 1990s. Since 1992, according to the
World Bank, poverty has at last begun to decline in both rural and urban areas. Using the cost of
basic needs method, it suggests that the number of “very poor” dropped from 41 per cent in 1983-84
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to 36 per cent in 1995-96. During the same period, the number of “poor” declined from 59 per cent
to 56 per cent, although “the depth and severity of poverty” increased significantly, worsening the
conditions of the poor.16 Also, rural poverty remained much higher than urban poverty throughout
this period.17
Table 4: Bangladesh: Human development indicators (1990-98) 
Year Life expectancy Adult literacy Real GDP Human Human
at birth rate per capita development development 
(years) (%) (US$) index rank
1990 51.8 35.3 872 0.189
147 (out of 
173 countries)
1992 52.2 36.6 1,160 0.309
146 (out of 
173 countries)
1994 56.4 37.3 1,331 0.368
144 (out of 
175 countries)
1998 58.6 40.1 1,361 0.461
146 (out of 
174 countries)
Source: UNDP, Human Development Reports 1993, 1994, 1997 and 2000 (New York:  Oxford University Press). 
While independent studies confirm that there have been some improvements in the living standards
of the majority (see Table 4), incidences of both “moderate” and “extreme” poverty are still very
high. Using the daily calorie intake method,18 most estimates show that almost half of the popula-
tion, about 47.5 per cent, remained trapped below the poverty line in 1995-96.19 The situation is
much worse when the Capability Poverty Measure (CPM) is used to determine poverty.20 According
to the Human Development Report 1996, the CPM value for Bangladesh is 76.9 per cent—one of the
highest in the world. The report reveals that 52.9 per cent of the total population lack access to
healthcare and malnutrition contributes to a majority of deaths of children under five. It also shows
that the profile of human deprivation in Bangladesh is significantly higher than many of its neigh-
bors, including, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India.21
What is even more important are the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor in both
urban and rural areas. Like many other developing countries, Bangladesh has experienced rising
inequalities since the beginning of the 1980s. For instance, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.372 in
1985 to 0.430 in 1995—a clear indication that inequalities are on the rise.22 Similarly, the number of
landless people increased significantly over the last two decades. A recent World Bank report notes
that “landlessness has significantly risen”—as many as 56 per cent of rural households were function-
ally landless in 1997 (i.e., they had no land or less than half an acre) compared to 46 per cent in
1983-84. This increase would have been larger if there had not been a large rural to urban migration
during this period.23
Despite such a dismal human development record, Bangladesh has already begun to witness some
impressive efforts to reduce poverty, largely through the implementation of various models of grass-
roots democratization and development adopted by its vibrant NGO sector. Bangladesh enjoys a
strong NGO community, involved in broader development activities. Some of them have already
become “legendary” in such areas as micro-credit, non-formal education, primary health care and
empowerment of the poor. Many of these NGOs, notably, the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), are widely acclaimed for their innovative development
strategies focusing on group-based mobilization, beneficiary participation and micro-enterprises.
They are particularly praised for successfully raising the issue of gender discrimination in a male-
dominated society, where traditional cultural practices keep women subordinated to men in virtually
every aspect of their lives. In these ways, the Bangladeshi NGO community is creating hope of dem-
ocratic development in Bangladesh in the 21st century.
The politics of distrust and violence
Bangladesh’s unstable political system remains the major source of disappointment in its search for
sustainable democratic development in the twenty-first century. Although the country witnessed the
restoration of democracy in 1991, continued conflict between the ruling party and the mainstream
opposition has perpetuated a highly volatile political landscape in the country. The widening mutual
distrust between the two political leaders, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Mrs. Khaleda Zia,
leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, has resulted in the creation of a chaotic situation where
rival groups are increasingly using violence to achieve their conflicting political goals. Most
observers suggest that if the two leaders fail to reconcile their personal differences, it seems likely
that Bangladesh will face an uncertain future, which will hinder its search for peace, development
and prosperity in the new millennium.
Development goals and priorities
Identifying the immediate need to effectively address the issue of poverty, the Government of
Bangladesh has set out the following broader development goals and priorities within the framework
of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002):
• Alleviation of poverty through accelerated economic growth during the plan period to bring
about a noticeable improvement in the standard of living
• Generation of substantial employment opportunities and increased productivity
• Improvement in the quality of life of the rural population through mobilization of the rural
masses and resources
• Transformation of the rural socio-economic structure to be more equitable, just and productive,
so that it contributes positively to the empowerment of the rural poor
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• Attainment of food production beyond the self-sufficiency level in the shortest possible time
• Human resources development with emphasis on compulsory primary education, vocational
training and laying the foundation for a knowledge-based society
• Development of rural and urban infrastructure to promote growth
• Development of industries essentially based on comparative advantage
• Development of hitherto neglected areas like the northwest region, Chittagong Hill Tracts and
coastal areas
• Achievement of a lower population growth rate and ensuring necessary health care and improved
nutrition of mother and child
• Strengthening the country’s scientific and technological base with emphasis on  generating new
technologies
• Protection and preservation of the physical environment by putting in place adequate regulatory
regimes and effective institutions
• Closing the gender gap by giving priority to women’s education, training, employment and
special support for education of girls
• Establishment of social justice through equitable distribution of income, resources, and opportu-
nities and creation of effective safety nets for the socially and economically disadvantaged sec-
tions of the population
• Putting in place effective local government institutions at different levels.24
Within such a broad development framework, the Government of Bangladesh is pursuing  several
strategic policies, as mentioned in a recent government document,25 to improve the socio-political
conditions of the poor, particularly those who are classified as “extreme poor”. The government has
identified a few interrelated factors, such as low economic growth, inequitable distribution of both
income and productive assets, growing unemployment and underemployment, high population
growth rate, low level of human resources development, frequent natural disasters, and limited access
to public services, as the major causes of continued poverty and under-development of the majority.
It has made an effort to devise what it calls a “pro-poor plan” for the alleviation of rural poverty in
the country. Some of the major objectives of the pro-poor plan, as outlined in the Fifth Five-Year
Plan, are summarized below:
• Develop democratically elected local government bodies which will ensure adequate representa-
tion of women
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• Improve the country’s human development profile through the expansion of education, health
care, family planning and welfare services
• Create income-generating opportunities for the poor by linking them with various social services
• Encourage the poor to build their own development organizations at the grassroots so that they
can tackle effectively their own developmental needs
• Enhance the technological skills of the poor in order to enable them to find productive employ-
ment
• Ensure the access of the poor to financial resources, particularly micro-credit operations
• Empower the poor and disadvantaged women by enabling them to participate in various devel-
opmental activities
• Develop an effective delivery system in order to minimize organizational expenditures.26
In short, rural development has been given a top priority in the Fifth Five-Year Plan. Its main objec-
tive is to reduce rural poverty by increasing both farm and non-farm production and by generating
self-employment opportunities for the poor. 
Poverty reduction strategy27
The government has also devised a two-fold poverty reduction strategy, as outlined in the Fifth Five-
Year Plan:
• Human Resources Development: The government plans to launch new projects in the areas of edu-
cation, health, family planning, social welfare, women and youth development and sanitation to
improve the country’s poor human development record. It also hopes to establish a variety of
export-oriented industries, such as electronics and garments, to create large-scale employment
opportunities for the rural poor.
• Economic Development of the Poor: The “pro-poor plan” aims to generate self-employment oppor-
tunities for the rural poor by targeting them through various programs. The Plan targets people
who are basically assetless/landless, owning less than 1.5 acres of land. In addition, to help these
poor to get involved in productive income-generating activities, the plan also offers training pro-
grams to enhance their ability to find employment.28
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Some of the major poverty alleviation programs undertaken by the government are briefly discussed
below:
• Safety nets: The government is using food aid to establish a safety net for the rural poor. Such a
program is implemented through four different types of activities: Food for Work; Test Relief;
Vulnerable Group Development; and Food for Education for Girl Students. While the first two
are safety nets against seasonal poverty, the latter two are designed to improve the status of the
most disadvantaged groups living in rural areas.
• Poverty-focused rural development projects: In order to both increase food production and create
self-employment opportunities for the poor in the rural areas, the government has established a
separate institution for the rural poor through the enactment of the Palli Bittahin (Rural
Assetless) Foundation in 1999. Such an institution is intended to widen opportunities for the
poor, particularly for women, to undertake various development projects, enabling them to
become self-reliant. The Foundation’s programs are supported by CIDA. 
• Provide low cost accommodation: The government seeks to strengthen its ongoing program called
“low cost accommodation for the poor” through a variety of projects, namely Asrayon (Shelter),
Adarsha Gram (Ideal Village), Ghorey Fera (Back to Village) and Karma Sangsthan Bank
(Employment Generation Bank). Most of these projects are designed to support the poor to
build their own shelters. 
• Welfare programs: The government is also implementing a number of welfare programs in rural
areas, including the old-age pension scheme which is intended to provide a token monthly
allowance of TK100, or less than C$3, to some 500,000 older men and women classified as
“extremely poor”. As well, the Foundation for the Development of the Handicapped and Old-
Age Homes was established to help under-privileged and vulnerable segments of society.29
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Canadian Development Assistance to Bangladesh: 
A brief overview
Canada’s development assistance to Bangladesh began in 1971, immediately following the war of lib-
eration and independence from Pakistan (see Tables 5 and 6). During the initial years, Canadian sup-
port consisted mainly of food aid, humanitarian assistance, relief and rehabilitation works, and
rebuilding basic infrastructure, which was almost totally destroyed during the war.30
Canada’s official development assistance (ODA) to Bangladesh is mainly channeled through the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which is responsible for managing about 75
per cent of the Canada’s total ODA budget. CIDA relies upon four major channels to provide assis-
tance to the developing world, including Bangladesh:
• Bilateral Programs: (government-to-government or country-to-country): These programs are
designed to provide financial assistance to a variety of development projects and/or programs
sponsored and/or supported by about 100 partner countries. Such programs constitute approxi-
mately 40 per cent of CIDA’s budget.
• Multilateral Programs: These programs support the development initiatives undertaken by a
variety of international organizations, such as the United Nations, Commonwealth, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  
• Partnership Programs: CIDA offers financial assistance to the development efforts of Canadian
non-governmental organizations in various parts of the developing world. 
• Business Cooperation Programs: In addition to assisting the Canadian business community in
promoting trade and investment for Canada in different parts of the world, these programs are




































Source: CIDA, Annual Reports until 1992-93; Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance, International
Development Information Centre (IDIC), Annual Reports, 1993-99, Hull. 
The ODA guidelines for Canada, as outlined in Canada in the World, and CIDA’s approach in Asia31
provide the basis for Canadian assistance to Bangladesh. CIDA’s programs in Bangladesh are largely
directed by the following six program priorities:
• Basic human needs
• Women in development
• Infrastructure services
• Human rights, democracy and good governance
• Private sector development 
• Environment.
However, CIDA’s Country Programming Framework (CPF) for Bangladesh, which was approved in
May 1999, concentrates its activities in two major areas. The CPF, which sets out the main objectives
and priorities for the allocation of Canadian development cooperation to Bangladesh in the coming
years, suggests that in order to meet the development challenges facing Bangladesh in the new mil-
lennium, CIDA’s program will revolve around: 
• Basic Human Needs: The majority of Canadian resources are to be directed at Bangladesh’s
basic human need programs, which promote human security at different levels. Such programs
are designed to reduce the sufferings of the poor and the needy, living in both rural and urban
areas. CIDA offers financial support to the provision of primary health care, basic education,
family planning, nutrition, micro-credit, shelter, water, and sanitation.
• Governance: Like the “good governance” programs of most donor organizations,32 CIDA’s gov-
ernance activity is directed primarily toward the improvement of the structure of development
management in Bangladesh. Its programs offer support to government and non-governmental
organizations, including the private sector, to “increase their institutional sustainability”. In
brief, CIDA’s governance programs address a few crucial issues such as transparency, policy
reform, accountability, and efficiency.33
Historically, Canadian development assistance to Bangladesh has focused more on the reduction of
poverty than any other development issue as poverty remains the major challenge for Bangladesh.
Along with its local and international partners, it has made efforts to help the country to escape both
“absolute” and “relative” poverty over the last 25 years. Key areas of development support include
food production, primary health care and family planning, literacy and primary education, income-
generating activities and/or micro-credit programs, water management, including irrigation,
fisheries development, flood control, agriculture and environment, infrastructure services, energy
development and rural electrification.34 (For a list of current CIDA projects involving government
organizations, NGOs, civil society groups and entrepreneurs see Table 7, p. 23.)  
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Table 6: Commitment and disbursement of Canadian bilateral aid to Bangladesh 
(1971 to 1997/98; US$ millions)
Year Commitment Disbursement
Food Commodity Project Total Food Commodity Project Total
Grant Grant Loan Grant Loan 7=2+3+ Grant Grant Loan Grant Loan 13=8+9+
(Loan) 4+5+6 (Loan) 10+11+12
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12
1971/72 24.100 - - 20.117 - 44.217 7.412 - - - - 7.412
1972/73 20.000 9.815 - 20.000 - 38.315 30.334 2.897 - 3.063 - 36.294
(6.5 L)
44.100 9.815 0.000 22.117 0.00 82.532 37.746 2.897 0.000 3.063 0.000 43.706
(6.5 L)
1973/74 18.700 8.123 - - 6.000 36.323 23.754 4.781 - 15.562 2.000 56.097
(3.5L) (10 L)
1974/75 55.000 13.832 - 6.200 - 75.032 52.3004 11.462 - 6.184 4.000 73.946
1975/76 - 20.604 - 6.600 - 27.204 .000 13.374 - 2.028 - 18.402
1976/77 20.000 7.000 - 10.000 - 37.000 20.000 18.019 - 1.651 - 39.670
1977/78 31.000 21.900 - 27.000 - 79.000 31.000 24.019 - 15.700 - 71.399
24.699 -
124.700 71.459 0.000 49.800 6.000 255.459 131.054 71.335 0.000 41.125 6.000 259.514
(3.5 L) (10 L)
1978/79 40.000 30.000 - 52.496 - 122.496 40.000 25.076 - 7.215 - 72.291
1979/80 74.800 20.000 - - - 94.800 40.000 25.000 - - - 65.000
114.800 50.000 0.000 52.469 0.000 217.296 80.000 50.076 0.000 7.215 0.000 137.291
1980/81 - 17.400 - 31.427 - 48.827 34.800 19.511 - 15.471 - 69.7852
1981/82 26.100 29.639 - 30.520 - 86.259 26.100 15.725 - 26.037 - 67.862
1982/83 82.000 23.500 - 2.608 - 108.108 59.800 14.985 - 10.900 - 85.685
1983/84 105.571 53.840 - 36.226 - 195.637 98.411 20.903 - 18.465 - 137.779
1984/85 136.522 - - 7.341 - 143.863 28.257 34.717 - 18.410 - 81.384
350.193 124.379 0.000 108.122 0.000 582.694 247.368 105.841 0.000 89.283 0.000 442.492
1985/86 - 41.277 - 59.646 - 100.923 81.138 6.318 - 10.843 - 98.299
1986/87 - 54.925 - 130.642 - 185.567 56.487 17.636 - 24.736 - 98.859
1987/78 130.726 - - - - 130.726 22.847 27.947 - 17.542 - 63.336
1988/89 7.416 - - 38.225 - 45.641 28.347 20.960 - 69.540 - 118.847
1989/90 - - - 47.280 - 47.280 33.225 0.000 - 70.423 - 103.648
138.142 96.202 0.000 275.793 0.000 510.137 222.044 72.861 0.000 193.074 0.000 487.989
1990/91 - - - 14.791 - 14.791 69.542 12.851 - 29.831 - 112.224
1991/92 52.785 29.016 - 30.507 - 112.308 14.234 11.089 - 36.443 - 61.776
1992/93 - - - - - 0.000 17.52 41.697 - 34.258 - 93.475
1993/94 - - - - - 0.000 12.692 0.121 - 19.021 - 31.834
1994/95 43.651 - - - - 43.651 4.639 14.992 - 27.463 - 47.094
96.436 29.016 0.000 45.298 0.000 170.75 118.627 80.75 0.000 147.016 0.000 346.393
1995/96 - - - 7.560 - 7.560 7.687 0.010 - 17.150 - 24.847
1996/97 - - - 12.352 - 12.352 16.220 0.004 - 14.219 - 30.443
1997/98 - - - 29.551 - 29.551 6.334 - - 8.144 - 14.478
0.000 0.000 0.000 49.463 0.000 49.463 30.241 0.014 0.000 39.513 0.000 69.768
Total 868.371 380.871 0.000 603.089 6.000 1868.331 867.080 383.774 0.000 520.299 6.000 1787.153
(10 L) (10 L)
L = Loan
Source: Government of Bangladesh, ERD.
18
While the general objective of these CIDA-supported programs is to reduce poverty, many of them
are directed toward the improvement of the status of women in Bangladesh’s male-dominated soci-
ety.  For instance, the Rural Maintenance Program, which is one of the major CIDA-supported proj-
ects in Bangladesh, aims to maintain approximately 72,000 km of rural roads through the generation
of employment for destitute women. The project provides training to poor women in maintaining
rural earthen roads. Since the inception of the project in 1983, it has created opportunities for about
180,000 destitute women to work year round in approximately 4,100 union parishads.35
Along with other donors, both bilateral and multilateral, CIDA plays an important role in assisting
the Government of Bangladesh to develop a national environmental regulatory framework, which is
expected to generate greater public awareness about the necessity of preserving the natural environ-
ment.
In addition to supporting government-sponsored programs, since the mid-1970s, CIDA has been
very active in assisting the NGO sector in emerging as a major development actor. It channels finan-
cial resources to a few selected Bangladeshi development NGOs, notably Proshika Manobik Kendra
and BRAC, helping them to strengthen their institutional capacities so that they take on a greater
role in achieving the broader goals of sustainable development. Finally, in association with key inter-
national organizations, CIDA also supports efforts to create an enabling environment for market-led
economic growth in Bangladesh.  
Although Bangladesh continues to be a major recipient of CIDA’s assistance, total disbursements
have declined since the fiscal year of 1990/91. As seen in Table 5, Canadian bilateral aid to
Bangladesh decreased from C$142.9 million in 1988/89 to C$ 56.0 million in 1998/99.36 In other
words, Bangladesh has witnessed a substantial cut in CIDA’s assistance in the 1990s, making Canada
a relatively small bilateral development partner of Bangladesh, which receives some US$2 billion
annually from both bilateral and multilateral sources. According to a report of the Government of
Bangladesh, Canada now ranks eleventh among donors in Bangladesh.37 Multilateral institutions,
particularly the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, are major sources of public develop-
ment finance in Bangladesh. A number of bilateral donors such as Japan and the United States also
inject a considerable amount of finance into the country’s aid-dependent economy. 
Despite being a relatively small player, Canada participates in the country’s well-established and
well-functioning donor coordination mechanisms and thus is able to play a role in Bangladesh’s quest
for democracy and development (a detailed discussion of such a strategy is presented in the section,
“Coherence between Canada and major donors”). As part of the Like-Minded Group (LMG), for
instance, Canada prepared a policy statement on Bangladesh’s governance for the Bangladesh
Development Forum meeting in Paris in April 1999. In the statement, not only did Canada express
its serious concerns over Bangladesh’s inability to improve its poor governance record, it also took
the opportunity to identify the major causes of Bangladesh’s failure to develop an enabling policy
environment for both accelerating growth and improving its development performance.38
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Poverty and policy coherence
Coherence between CIDA and DFAIT
At the headquarters level, the institutional relationship between CIDA and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) with respect to Bangladesh is maintained largely
through informal contacts between the desk officers of these two organizations. Although it appears
that both of the departments enjoy organizational autonomy to design and implement their policies
toward Bangladesh, the desk officers of these two theoretically “independent”, but somewhat inter-
linked organizations use their personal contacts to keep each other informed about their activities.39
Besides, if a need arises, DFAIT and CIDA officials meet occasionally to share information in order
to achieve their organizational objectives. Both in the design of programs and in the formulation of
policies, they also often consult each other which helps keep the officials of these organizations
informed. Despite these efforts to maintain organizational collaboration, during our interviews it
transpired that most CIDA and DFAIT officials considered themselves as “independent”, pursuing
distinct goals in Bangladesh.40
What was interesting to observe, at the field level, were the various ways in which these two very dif-
ferent organizations worked in conjunction with each other. Both CIDA and DFAIT officials have
formal meetings at least once a month, if not more frequently, to share information and to discuss
issues of mutual interest. “Such meetings help us”, according to a DFAIT representative, “develop
and maintain good working relationships between the two organizations.” A CIDA official at the
Canadian High Commission in Bangladesh also shared this opinion: “we work like a team; we coop-
erate with each other to achieve our common goals”.41
However, not all field officials felt the same way.  “Just because we meet every month, and we inform
each other about our relevant activities”, according to another CIDA official, “does not necessarily
mean that we have a warm organizational relationship. We know that we are different, representing
two seemingly diverse sets of organizational goals and interests”.42
Given the recent revival of a market-led approach to development, how rational or valid is this state-
ment?43 The resurgence of neo-liberal models of development has in effect created the need for both
DFAIT and CIDA to step up efforts to cooperate more effectively in order to achieve Canadian
broader foreign policy objectives, namely “the promotion of prosperity and employment”.44 Since
CIDA has already started adapting to the recent dramatic changes in the global political economy
and since DFAIT has begun to assume a new role in exploring opportunities for Canadians in the
global market, it becomes inevitable for them to work out a more cooperative institutional arrange-
ment for enhancing organizational collaboration. Such an arrangement may help them reach com-
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mon ground without changing poverty reduction as the main development priority for CIDA and
DFAIT in a country like Bangladesh.    
This sort of close organizational collaboration, however, could emerge as a direct threat to CIDA’s
focus on meeting the needs of the poor if CIDA falls prey to what can be called the ideology of mar-
ket fundamentalism.  Excessive focus on either expanding economic growth or promoting Canadian
business interests may easily overshadow CIDA’s commitment to both poverty reduction and sustain-
able development. While conducting field research, it became evident that several DFAIT officials
and Canadian business organizations misunderstood the purpose of Canadian development coopera-
tion in Bangladesh. A number thought that CIDA’s programs were not sufficiently directed toward
the creation of business and investment opportunities.45 One Canadian official made frequent refer-
ence to the programs of the USAID and the World Bank to suggest that CIDA’s activities should
increasingly focus on promoting Canadian business interests in such areas as energy, telecommunica-
tions, manufacturing and services.46
However, most CIDA officials we interviewed rejected such a view, instead arguing that: 
CIDA is concerned primarily about sustainable development… we have been sent here to
help the Bangladeshi government and civil society groups to strengthen their capacity so that
they become more effective in reducing poverty. We are not here to use aid money to create
business and investment opportunities for Canada.47
A well-functioning coherence mechanism not only would allow CIDA and DFAIT officials to
develop a greater understanding of each other’s objectives, but also may actually help Canada to
achieve its broader foreign policy goals. 
Coherence between CIDA headquarters and the field office
While CIDA headquarters and the field office seem to work together as a team, this report finds
CIDA to be a centralized and hierarchical institution especially with respect to designing and imple-
menting policies and programs. The decision-making power appears to have rested in the hands of a
few upper level officials based in Ottawa. Headquarters usually defines, guides and prioritizes the
context in which the field officials operate, which in turn affects negatively, this report observes, the
ability of field level officials to more actively and effectively influence Bangladesh’s development
process. Such a practice is particularly confusing for an organization that promotes widely such con-
cepts as “participation”, “decentralization” and “empowerment”. 
This is not to say that CIDA headquarters either makes major policy decisions or designs programs
without seeking comments and/or suggestions from the relevant field officials. CIDA headquarters
often ensures that policies are formulated and programs designed in consultation with the field
office. The usual practice is that the headquarters asks for comments and/or inputs from the local
office prior to the formulation of a country policy and/or strategy. Similarly, when preparing a proj-
ect, the program manager consults with the relevant field officer in order to define and structure the
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context. In addition, headquarters officials organize field visits to gather first-hand information so
that they can assess more accurately the need for and significance of a particular program and/or
project.  
Table 7: Current CIDA projects in Bangladesh
Project Name Budget Duration
(C$) (years)
Projects with the Government of Bangladesh
Dampara-Water Management 5,000,000 5
Kalni-Kushiyara River Community Development 2,890,000 2
Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) 450,000 5
Farm to Market Enterprise Development (FMED) 10,000,000 5
Poultry Feed Project 4,850,000 4
Rural Bittahenn Institution (Micro-finance) 67,166,000 11
Rural Maintenance Program (RMP) (Phase III) 13,500,000 6
Infrastructure Investment Facilitation Centre (IIFC) 5,000,000 3
Modernization of the BWDB Accounting System 2,500,000 2
Private Sector Regulations Implementation & Support Mechanism (PRISM) 2,000,000 4
Health & Population Sector Reform 25,400,000 5
Policy Leadership and Advocacy for Gender Equity (PLAGE) 4,940,000 3
Environmental Management 13,076,000 6
Bangladesh Railway Program (Phase II) 99,446,000 11
Projects with NGOs
Proshika Kendra (Phase V) 14,400,000 5
BRAC Rural Development Program (Phase II) 14,250,000 5
Institutional Support for Local NGOs (FIT/PRIP) 2,950,000 3
NGO Policy Education 2,700,000 3
Adolescent Development Program 2,600,000 5
Gender Fund (Phase II) 2,000,000 5
Canada Fund for Local Initiatives 600,000 1
Bangladesh Environment Initiatives Fund 500,000 4
CIDA Partnership Branch Initiatives 3,000,000 3
Other
BUET/University of Alberta Institutional Linkage 9,680,000 16
Program Support Unit (PSU) 4,650,000 7
Food Aid Program
Food Aid: 220,000 metric tons 49,500,000 3
Source: CIDA.  
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Yet such a process does not take away the fact that local officials enjoy very little autonomy with
regard to the design and implementation of various development projects, let alone policies. In most
cases, as stated by several local officials, consultation does not necessarily give them a voice in deci-
sion-making. When asked, a CIDA officer commented on this issue by saying: 
We can only send our analysis, report our views, and put forward recommendations
as to what we think appropriate for CIDA to do; the decisions are going to be made
by Ottawa. And it is most likely that our judgment might not be reflected in the final
decision.48
For instance, the role of the local CIDA officials in the formulation of the recent CPF was limited
primarily to discussions and comments on the draft document. As we were informed, having pre-
pared the draft in Ottawa, the document was sent to the High Commission for review and com-
ments. Although the local officials were able to meet, discuss, and prepare their comments on the
draft CPF, unlike the practice of other key donor organizations/agencies working in Bangladesh,
they had very little opportunity to either assess the nature of CIDA’s intervention in Bangladesh or to
recommend alternative policy or program options in order for CIDA to have greater impact on
Bangladesh’s development process.49
While most headquarters officials we spoke with identified the issue of accountability as the main
reason for Ottawa to be in control over its policy-making process, the overall need for the local
office to respond positively and quickly to the emerging development concerns and initiatives at the
micro-level is basically ignored.50 What implications does a top-down decision-making process have
for addressing the challenges of poverty? In other words, how does such a centralized decision-mak-
ing mechanism affect CIDA’s poverty reduction efforts in Bangladesh? 
A CIDA official claims that: 
The lack of autonomy for the local office not only affects its ability to undertake pro-
grams and policies based on the conditions at the grassroots, more importantly, it also
creates undesirable tension in the institutional relationship between CIDA and its vari-
ous local partners, including the Government of Bangladesh.51
When discussing CIDA’s role in enhancing donor coordination, a donor representative in Dhaka
commented that:
Although CIDA officials always take interest in enhancing donor coordination, they
often fail to make adjustments with other donors’ policies. This is simply because they
are too inflexible; or at least that is what I have gathered from my long association with
CIDA officials working in Bangladesh.52
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Most Bangladeshi government and NGO executives that we interviewed also expressed similar views.
According to a representative of the Bangladesh government, who interacts with different donors on
a regular basis: 
Local CIDA officials are not empowered enough to make a decision on the basis of their
own assessment. The headquarters does not probably leave any room for allowing the
local CIDA officials to make any major decision at the field level.53
The present practice of hiring Canadian consultants and/or consulting firms by Ottawa also affects
the ability of local officials to monitor effectively development activities in Bangladesh.54 In most
cases, as informed by local officials during our fieldwork, headquarters does not consult with the
local office before hiring a consulting firm and/or individual consultants, perhaps because this would
be administratively complex. Although the consultants work in close cooperation with the field
office, they tend to ignore the presence of local CIDA officials and often prefer to maintain direct
liaison with Ottawa, making the local office feel that they have no relevant expertise necessary to
oversee the work of the consultants.   
Coherence between Canadian government and business organizations
One of the major Canadian foreign policy objectives, as stated in Canada in the World, is 
to gain access for our goods and services abroad; to reinforce an open, fair and pre-
dictable set of rules governing international trade and investment; and to provide
means to ensure that Canadian firms are able to take advantage of opportunities
abroad.55
It is assumed that Canadian development assistance not only enables the developing world to reduce
poverty, but also it will create opportunities for Canadian companies and individuals to grow and
prosper.56 In other words, it is expected that Canadian aid to developing countries will lead to trade,
investment, and employment opportunities for Canada. Questions should be raised about the impact
of linking aid to trade in this way, in particular how the promotion of Canadian business interests
abroad affects CIDA’s focus on sustainable human development. Such a policy reorientation may
help CIDA to support the Government of Canada in achieving its goal of “global prosperity,” more
than CIDA’s altruistic and humanistic vision.57 But the issue here is whether it will better position
CIDA to support the efforts of the government and people of Bangladesh to reduce poverty.
Given the complex development challenges facing Bangladesh, both CIDA and DFAIT may con-
sider helping the country create greater trade and investment opportunities by developing an inte-
grated country strategy. Most analysts suggest that Bangladesh’s poverty reduction tasks will become
much more complicated if the country fails to increase its annual rate of economic growth from the
current five per cent to a minimum of seven per cent. The realization of such a growth plan will
require higher levels of investment, predominantly from domestic sources (both private and public)
though private foreign direct investment will play a key role in certain sectors. If CIDA is to broaden
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its poverty reduction efforts, it should strengthen its support of measures to stabilize Bangladesh’s
macro-economy.58
For instance, CIDA’s governance programs,59 which are designed primarily to enhance the capacity
of the state, private sector and civil society groups to manage the economic and social resources of a
country, can be used more effectively to create an enabling environment for growth and social devel-
opment in Bangladesh. This will require CIDA, in association with other donor organizations, to
address such crucial issues as the implementation of market reforms, the enhancement of private sec-
tor competitiveness, the improvement in investment opportunities for private foreign investors, and
the expansion of foreign markets for Bangladeshi products, especially in Canada.60
Both the acceleration of economic growth and the creation of investment and business opportunities
for Bangladesh will largely depend upon the willingness and/or the ability of DFAIT to complement
CIDA’s governance and poverty reduction programs. In particular, an integrated approach could
ensure that Canada not only takes advantage of Bangladesh’s emerging economic opportunities, but
also plays a more defined role in accelerating growth and reducing poverty in Bangladesh. This
would require DFAIT to develop an enabling policy environment, i.e. one which helped Bangladeshi
products to find a relatively secure place in the Canadian market, on the one hand, and which facili-
tated more investment and business opportunities for Canadian entrepreneurs in Bangladesh, on the
other. There is no doubt that Bangladesh’s geographical remoteness and its frenzied political landscape
would make this a truly challenging job for DFAIT.61 According to a DFAIT representative: 
Bangladesh’s geographical remoteness and its uncertain political climate are two of the main
reasons why Canadian companies take little or no interest in the country’s emerging market.
Even the few Canadian companies that took the trouble to travel to Bangladesh, became
very quickly disillusioned about the prospects for their potential investment in Bangladesh
due to the country’s highly bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt management system.62
Another DFAIT representative voiced similar concerns: 
Bangladesh’s chance to join the “emerging tiger club” is becoming increasingly slim because
of its highly unstable and unpredictable political environment. Relentless bickering between
the government and the mainstream Opposition has created an anti-investment climate in
Bangladesh, where Canadian companies don’t want to go... Can you really blame them for
not pumping their money into a place, which is full of uncertainties?63
While neither country is a high priority trading partner for the other, bilateral trade between
Bangladesh and Canada grew by 42 per cent from US$103 million in 1990 to US$146 million in
1998. As Table 8 shows, Canadian imports from Bangladesh tripled from US$31 million in 1990 to
US$95 million in 1998, while exports fell by a third from US$72 million to US$51million. This led
the trade surplus to move from US$41 million in Canada’s favour to US$44 million in Bangladesh’s
favour. After a sharp decline in Canadian exports to Bangladesh to US$20 million in 1993, there was
a recovery in 1994, though exports remained below the levels recorded in the early 1990s. 
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Table 8: Canada’s trade relations with Bangladesh (in US$ millions)
Year Imports Exports Trade balance
1990 31 72 41
1991 28 76 48
1992 35 67 32
1993 45 20 -25
1994 54 60 6
1995 73 53 -20
1996 64 42 -22
1997 87 65 -22
1998 95 51 -44
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Major Bangladeshi goods sold in Canada include ready-made garments, knitwear, jute and jute
goods, leather and leather products, shrimps, handicrafts, ceramic goods and frozen fish (see
Table 9). Many Bangladeshi producers, being new and small business actors, find the Canadian mar-
ket highly competitive and seemingly dominated by a number of Asian and Latin American suppli-
ers, mainly from China, South Korea, India and Mexico. As explained by Tofail Ahmed, Bangladesh’s
Minister for Commerce and Industries, to Raymond Chan, then Secretary of State for Asia Pacific
region, during his visit to Bangladesh in May 1999, Bangladeshi producers need continued financial
and political support from both the Canadian government and business organizations in order to
penetrate Canada’s market successfully. 
Table 9: Major imports to and exports from Canada (in C$ millions, 1999)
Imports to Canada from Bangladesh Exports from Canada to Bangladesh
Apparel and clothing accessories 124.0 Cereals 50.5
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks 7.3 Vegetables 37.2
Other textile articles 5.4 Oilseeds, oleaginous fruits 8.1
Headgear 4.7 Iron and steel 6.7
Vegetable, textile fibres 3.9 Pharmaceutical products 5.8
Toys, games, sports articles 0.9 Wood pulp 3.1
Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Country, and Exports by Country, 1999.
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Indeed, the issue of Canadian private investment in Bangladesh was top on the agenda during the
Secretary of State’s visit. A number of Bangladeshi ministers, including the Ministers for Commerce
and Industries, Finance, Telecommunications and Energy, briefed the Secretary of State about the
opportunities for Canadian private capital to invest in such areas as natural gas, power, telecommuni-
cations, computer software and data processing, electronic goods and agro-processing. They
explained how Bangladesh’s rapidly expanding market had increased the space for Canadian prod-
ucts, particularly wheat, oilseeds, vegetables, chemical goods, animal products and various types of
equipment.64
Table 10: Bangladesh’s export markets (US$millions)
Year Total Exports % of Exports % of  Exports % of 
exports to US total exports to EU total exports to Canada total exports 
to US to EU to Canada
1990 1,672 510 30 527 32 31 2
1991 1,687 449 27 697 41 28 2
1992 2,037 734 36 755 37 35 2
1993 2,277 765 34 900 40 45 2
1994 2,650 886 33 1,088 41 54 2
1995 3,129 999 32 1,386 44 73 2
1996 3,297 1,019 31 1,579 48 64 2
1997 3,628 1,290 36 1,528 42 87 2
1998 3,822 1,368 36 1,745 46 95 2
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years.
Bangladeshi government and business representatives also voiced their growing concern over the
future of the garment industry that had been the driving force behind the country’s remarkable
export growth. In particular, they asked Canada to consider granting Bangladeshi products more
favourable treatment, including duty-free entry for Bangladeshi garments.65
This support could be given in a variety of ways. Canada offers special tariff treatment to imports
from Bangladesh under the General Preferential Tariff (GPT). As a least-developed country,
Bangladesh enjoys duty-free treatment for all products covered by the GPT. But most clothing is
excluded; only clothing from countries with free trade agreements with Canada (notably Mexico) is
duty-free. This discrepancy will become more important with the phase-out of the bilateral quotas
governing international trade in clothing under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC). Under the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA), Bangladeshi garment manufacturers enjoyed
preferential growth rates in their quotas, and in general the quota system was important for the
development of the garment industry in Bangladesh. The phase-out of this system by the year 2005,
coupled with tariff structures that favour competing suppliers, may well lead to the closure of a num-
ber of factories in Bangladesh and to widespread unemployment for garment workers.66
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Continued Canadian interest in improving the bilateral trade and investment relationship is crucial
in accelerating growth and reducing mass poverty in Bangladesh.
Coherence between Canadian government and
non-governmental organizations 
Using both formal and informal mechanisms, DFAIT and CIDA headquarters organize separate
consultations with various non-state actors, including NGOs, civil society groups and private compa-
nies. The frequency of such meetings depends on the urgency of the subject under discussion.
Usually the NGO Partnership Branch of CIDA holds an annual consultation meeting in Ottawa
with relevant Canadian NGOs and private sector organizations, including Canadian executing agen-
cies (CEAs).67 In addition, CIDA’s Bangladesh desk organizes policy dialogues with those Canadian
NGOs which, either directly or through their local partners, carry out development activities in
Bangladesh. Respective desk officers also maintain informal contacts on a fairly regular basis with
these NGOs.68 In contrast, while DFAIT also engages in dialogue with civil society, its interaction is
more frequent with business representatives than with NGOs and civil society groups working to
improve the quality of poor people’s lives.69
CIDA headquarters’ consultative meetings with NGO executives are designed, as suggested by both
CIDA officials and NGO representatives, primarily to share information and discuss policies, pro-
grams and policy-relevant issues, and to hear the voice of the voluntary sector. Most NGOs take
these consultations very seriously as they seek to influence CIDA’s policies, programs and priorities.
They view them as an excellent opportunity to discuss alternative development agendas that focus on
the adoption of pro-poor, pro-environment and pro-partner policies. However, most NGO repre-
sentatives do not think that the meetings or their pressure strategies have any real impact on CIDA’s
decision-making. This is because CIDA uses such consultations as a process, according to one NGO
executive, “of rationalizing and/or legitimizing their already approved programs and policies”.70 In
other words, NGOs may raise popular concerns, but the decision-making power ultimately rests in
the hands of high-level CIDA officials. 
What, then, is the purpose of the consultation process? Is it merely a “look good, feel good” exercise?
A Canadian NGO representative answered these questions by saying:
CIDA holds consultation meetings with us because they know that we are knowledgeable;
we can provide an objective, informative analysis of what is happening in Bangladesh and
other parts of the world.  However, our opinion hardly matters to them; they use their own
judgment to make decisions.71
Despite such criticisms, all NGO representatives we interviewed agreed that these consultation
meetings and/or dialogues were bridging the gap in understanding between civil society and the
Canadian government, particularly CIDA headquarters.  More important perhaps is that these meet-
ings have earned NGOs the recognition that they can help Canadian development cooperation
achieve its poverty reduction objectives by successfully targeting and reaching the poor. Most
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Canadian government officials that we interviewed tended to agree that, NGOs perform an impor-
tant intermediary role in both supplying information and facilitating the construction of a pro-poor
decision-making process.
Coherence between Canada and major donors 
Bangladesh is fortunate to have a fairly well institutionalized mechanism for donor coordination
through which the donors interact with each other in general, and coordinate their developmental
programs in particular. The mechanisms are also widely used by the donor community to influence
relevant policies of the Government of Bangladesh. Among the mechanisms, the following deserve
special attention: 
The Development Forum (Annual Aid Consortium Meeting)
Through the World Bank-led formal mechanism called the Bangladesh Development Forum (previ-
ously known as the Annual Aid Consortium Meeting), donor policies and Bangladesh’s development
performance are coordinated and reviewed. Under the guidance of the World Bank, the Aid
Consortium was established in 1974 to meet annually both to review the performance of
Bangladesh’s economy and to pledge official development assistance to Bangladesh. The Group is
comprised of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the US, the Asian Development
Bank, the European Union, the International Development Association, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, and various United Nations organizations, including the UNDP Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia also participate in the annual aid club meeting as observers. Table 11 shows bilat-
eral aid to Bangladesh from these various donors during the period 1971/72 to 1997/98.
Prior to the meeting, the World Bank prepares a country paper, known as the “Country Economic
Memorandum” (CEM) that not only critically reviews Bangladesh’s macro- and microeconomic per-
formance, but also assesses the need for further external aid for the following fiscal year. Viewing the
meeting as an opportunity either to get involved in constructive policy dialogue with relevant actors,
or to address issues of critical importance, individual donor countries or organizations or a group of
donors make short statements at the meeting. For instance, on behalf of the Like Minded Group, the
Canadian, Swedish, Dutch, Norwegian, and Danish government representatives made statements on
a variety of development-related issues at the aid consortium meeting held in April 1999. Such a
forum also allows the Government of Bangladesh to identify potential areas for future development
cooperation. Innovations in recent years have included the organizing of an Investors’ Forum and a
Civil Society Forum on the fringes of the Development Forum, though in both cases further work is
needed to enhance the results.  
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Table 11: Bilateral aid to Bangladesh by 20 major donors (1971/72 to 1997/98; US$millions)
Donor Food Commodity Project Total
Grant Loan Total Grant Loan Total Grant Loan Total Grant Loan Total
2+5+8 3+6+9 11+12
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. IDA - - 0.0 - 2036.9 2036.9 - 3910.6 3910.6 0.0 4547.5 5947.5
2. Japan 230.7 163.2 393.9 1425.8 1371.6 2797.4 595.1 1321.5 1916.6 2251.6 2856.3 5107.9
3. ADB - - 0.0 - 637.2 637.2 26.2 3255.7 3281.8 26.2 3892.9 3919.0
4. US 1209.9 484.2 1694.1 442.4 146.2 588.6 779.7 133.0 912.7 2432.0 763.5 3195.4
5. Canada 867.0 10.0 877.0 383.8 - 383.8 520.3 6.0 526.3 1771.2 16.0 1787.2
6. UN system 1102.1 - 1102.1 158.0 - 158.0 414.0 - 414.0 1674.0 0.0 1674.1
(ex. UNICEF)
7. Germany 103.2 2.5 105.7 321.2 196.7 517.9 650.6 68.8 719.4 1075.0 267.9 1342.9
8. UK 58.5 - 58.5 382.0 62.3 444.3 605.4 - 605.4 1045.9 62.3 1108.2
9. EU 624.7 - 624.7 112.0 48.0 160.0 300.8 - 300.8 1037.4 48.0 1085.4
10. Nether lands 14.8 - 14.8 433.1 23.7 456.8 430.4 47.6 478.0 878.3 71.3 949.6
11. Saudi Arabia 110.7 - 110.7 295.5 19.7 315.2 176.3 274.6 450.9 582.5 294.3 876.9
12. Sweden 31.2 - 31.2 196.5 - 196.5 355.8 10.6 366.4 583.5 10.6 594.1
13. Norway 10.5 - 10.5 186.9 - 186.9 343.7 - 343.7 541.0 0.0 541.0
14. France 61.8 - 61.8 14.0 20.2 34.2 212.5 226.3 438.9 288.3 246.5 534.5
15. Denmark 12.5 - 12.5 114.7 7.5 122.2 337.5 47.2 384.7 464.7 54.7 519.4
16. UNICEF 23.5 - 23.5 27.0 - 27.0 399.0 - 399.0 449.4 0.0 449.4
17. Russia 4.9 45.0 49.9 29.7 19.3 49.0 - 295.0 295.0 34.6 359.4 393.9
18. Australia 251.0 49.2 300.2 15.2 - 15.2 62.9 - 62.9 329.2 49.2 378.4
19. India 113.3 - 113.3 69.6 59.5 129.1 1.1 126.7 127.8 184.0 186.2 370.2
20. ISDB - - 0.0 - 165.0 165.0 16.4 99.3 115.7 16.4 264.4 280.8
Total 4830.3 754.1 5584.4 4607.3 4814.0 9421.3 6227.7 9822.8 16050.6 15665.3 15390.9 31056.3
All Donors 4891.7 762.6 5654.3 4755.5 5009.7 9765.2 6437.6 11363.5 17801.1 16084.8 17135.7 33220.6
Source: Government of Bangladesh, ERD. 
CIDA participates actively in the Forum meetings to both address Bangladesh’s development chal-
lenges and reflect on the success and/or failure of development initiatives in the country.  It uses this
larger development context, often in association with the Like-Minded Group, to review various
strategies and programs that Bangladesh employs  to achieve its twin objectives of poverty reduction
and rapid economic growth. Through its participation in the meeting, CIDA pursues its own devel-
opment agenda and makes its own programs more visible. 
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The Local Consultation Group (LCG)
Donors in Bangladesh share information and coordinate aid through a well-established mechanism
called the “Local Consultation Group (LCG)” which was established in 1974 under the direction of
the World Bank. The LCG is divided into 19 sub-groups, each of which is led by a representative of
a relevant donor organization and/or country. A list of the sub-groups and their present leaders are
presented in Table 12.  As seen in the table, Canada currently presides over the NGOs and Micro-
finance sub-groups.72
Most sub-groups meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of mutual interests. While the intensity of
activities vary considerably, most of these groups work together to enhance coordination between
donor programs in Bangladesh.  In so doing, they share useful information, prepare policy-relevant
reports and documents, identify new areas of cooperation and prescribe policy options. Apart from
coordination, these sub-groups also serve as a policy lobby, through which they often advise the
Government of Bangladesh on various development issues. The government itself is represented on
a third of the sub-groups, for instance it participates in the group on governance, health, education
and poverty. 
Table 12 : List of LCG sub-groups 
Sub-group Lead donor
• Agriculture • World Bank
• Fisheries • ODA 
• Water Management • Netherlands
• Environment • USAID
• Power • lead donor
• Rural Infrastructure • Sweden
• Railways • ADB
• Urban Sector • ADB 
• Water Supply and Sanitation • UNDP/World Bank/RWSG
• Education • Netherlands
• Health and Population • World Bank
• NGOs • Canada
• Poverty Issues • UNDP
• WID Issues • UNDP
• Good Governance • UNDP
• Food Aid • WFP
• Technical Assistance Coordination • IMF
• Micro-finance • Canada
• Private Sector Development • USAID/World Bank
Source: The World Bank Resident Mission, Dhaka, Bangladesh and ‘The World Bank’s Assistance to Bangladesh.
Partnership in Development’ at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org consulted December 19, 2000.
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While these sub-groups have increasingly taken an active role in developing a common understand-
ing and a shared position on various relevant issues, they often work hard to reduce their differences.
According to a representative of a key donor organization: 
We do take interest in donor coordination... We attend the meetings of LCGs, dis-
cussing policy issues with our partners. This does not necessarily mean that we
always try to develop a common approach... You have to keep in mind that we have
our own priorities.73
This reflects the difficulty donors usually face in generating a broader consensus on the needs and
priorities of Bangladesh’s development challenges. The task of coordination is indeed a difficult one
given the reality that donors often pursue distinct, if not entirely different, development policies and
programs. Despite such complexities, donors in Bangladesh appear to have successfully used the pre-
vailing coordination mechanism to both minimize inconsistencies and promote an overall coherence
between their developmental programs, priorities and policies. A relatively new instrument is the
sector-wide approach (or SWAp) that has been used in Bangladesh in the case of health program-
ming and funding.
The Like-Minded Countries (LMCs)
The Like-Minded Countries (LMCs), also known as the Like-Minded Group, consist of Canada,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, which emerged as an alternative voice to the
World Bank-dominated aid consortium meeting in the early 1980s. The group made its appearance
in 1984 through the publication of a report prepared by The North-South Institute entitled Rural
Poverty in Bangladesh.74 This report provided the basis for taking the development agenda beyond
the traditional macroeconomic concerns75. Since then, the group has taken on a greater role in both
reducing poverty and donor coordination. It has made several attempts to maintain its “unique” posi-
tion, focusing more on the socio-cultural dimensions of development than macroeconomic issues. In
its effort to develop an alternative approach to poverty reduction, between 1990 and 1996, the group
published two more books entitled: Can Rural Development Be Financed From Below: Local resource
mobilization in Bangladesh and 1987-1994: Dynamics of rural poverty in Bangladesh.
Apart from publications, the LMCs meet occasionally to discuss issues of mutual interest in general,
and to develop a somewhat common approach to poverty reduction and democratic development, in
particular. More important, perhaps, is that they take initiatives to review the state of Bangladesh’s
development and present joint statements at the Development Forum. As a core member of the
group, Canada has continued to use the LMCs’ influence to assert its distinct role in promoting
democracy and development in Bangladesh.   
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The Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) and Inter-Agency Coordination
The Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) was established in 1981 as an information exchange
forum, involving the principal UN funding agencies providing development assistance to
Bangladesh. The initial members were UNDP, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF.
The World Food Programme joined in 1983 and IFAD became a member of the group in 1988.
Their main objective is to coordinate their programs and work together to achieve the goals of
development in Bangladesh. However, the group’s activity is limited primarily to its multilateral
members.
Coherence between Canadian and Bangladeshi government 
organizations
The official bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and Canada can be characterized as “friendly”
and “warm”. As members of the Commonwealth and signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, both countries share a foreign policy interest in global peace and human security. At the UN
and other international fora, Canada and Bangladesh often cooperate with each other to reduce
poverty, to fight hunger and to put an end to human suffering. 
Since the inception of Bangladesh in 1971, Canada has shown its interest in the socio-economic
development of the country, providing financial and technological assistance for the reduction of
mass poverty. Despite budgetary cutbacks by the Government of Canada, Bangladesh still remains,
as mentioned earlier, the largest recipient of CIDA aid, receiving a total of C$96.1 million in
1998/99, including aid via multilateral institutions. Canadian country-to-country assistance that year
amounted to C$56.04 million, i.e., approximately 2.5 per cent of Bangladesh’s total annual aid
receipts.76
The Government of Bangladesh primarily relies upon three main agencies, namely the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the
Ministry of Finance, for coordinating its political, economic and trade relations with external organi-
zations and countries, including Canada. However, the ERD is regarded as the focal point for nego-
tiation, mobilization and coordination of all foreign resources, namely food aid, commodity aid, and
technical assistance. The agency deals with bilateral and multilateral donors as well as international
organizations. In addition, Bangladesh has a number of joint commissions and committees with sev-
eral countries, constituted under general economic and technical cooperation agreements. These
mechanisms are used for enhancing economic and technical cooperation between Bangladesh and its
partners.
CIDA’s assistance to Bangladesh is largely coordinated through the ERD.  Also, Canada often deals
directly with the line ministry in order to ensure the most efficient use of its funds. Most Bangladeshi
government officials we contacted, which included representatives from a variety of such ministries
and/or divisions as Foreign, Commerce and Industry, Environment, ERD, Finance, and the Board of
Investment, expressed mixed feelings about greater coherence between CIDA and the Government
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of Bangladesh. While they were happy with CIDA’s interest in the country’s development, most
Bangladeshi officials did not approve of CIDA’s management approach.77 In a meeting with a group
of Bangladeshi officials, the following view was shared with us: 
CIDA never allows us to work as a partner. From the very preparatory stage of a
project, CIDA wants to ensure that it is in charge of everything, from appointing
consultants to spending the allocated budget. What is even worse is that CIDA
never consults with us; it makes decisions on its own.78
Another official, who served as director of a CIDA-funded project, commented on this issue
by saying: 
This (project) was a purely donor-driven project. CIDA prepared and implemented the proj-
ect in such a way that it only served the interests of Canada. The project never meant to pay
any attention to our priorities.79
The 12 Bangladeshi government officials that we spoke with also voiced similar concerns. Most criti-
cized CIDA for not giving them the space necessary for playing the role of an “equal partner”.80
Such criticisms were contested by CIDA officials, on the grounds that no project is implemented
without extensive consultation and project documents illustrate that the Bangladeshi government’s
concerns and priorities are met. Similarly it was noted that the Government of Bangladesh has an
equal voice in the project steering and management committees. On the other hand, they justified
CIDA’s role as a “dominant partner” on the grounds that “incompetent and corrupt Bangladeshi offi-
cials compelled us to ensure proper utilization of Canadian taxpayers’ money”.81 A similar view was
expressed by a representative of a key donor organization in Dhaka: “Can you really blame us for not
placing our confidence in Bangladeshi government officials when you know that they are not even
trusted by their own people?”  
These critical observations were common among various donor representatives interviewed in
Bangladesh. Indeed, administrative bottlenecks, the absence of professionalism among a section of
career civil servants, the demands for kickbacks by Bangladeshi administrators, and the political use
of aid money are partly responsible for donors wanting to play a more pro-active role in the country’s
development.
Coherence between Canadian government and Bangladeshi NGOs 
As part of CIDA’s global policy to work more closely with non-state actors, particularly intermediary
NGOs, CIDA currently involves Bangladesh’s proliferating NGO sector82 in the implementation of
various development activities. It provides financial assistance to those NGOs and civil society
groups that undertake policy research and participatory development, either directly or through
Canadian NGOs, such as CUSO, Aga Khan Foundation Canada (AKFC) and Inter Pares. Such sup-
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port is intended to strengthen the institutional capabilities of a group of selected NGOs, namely
BRAC, Proshika, the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), the Association for Development Agencies
in Bangladesh (ADAB) and UBINIG, which are widely known for their ability to effectively influ-
ence Bangladesh’s development process and contexts. 
Most Bangladeshi NGOs we interviewed suggested that CIDA’s support gave them greater recogni-
tion as development actors and enabled them to create more space for their activities. Many are now
widely acclaimed for their innovative development strategies focusing on group-based mobilization,
beneficiary participation, micro-enterprises and the involvement of women in various income-gener-
ating activities. CIDA’s continued assistance also increased, as they explained to us, their organiza-
tional effectiveness and thus helped to improve their development performance.  
Despite such positive reviews of CIDA’s operations in Bangladesh, quite a few NGO executives with
whom we spoke were of the opinion that CIDA’s funding collaboration was primarily limited to
those larger NGOs that were well-established, better known and qualified. They said that CIDA
tended to overlook small and medium-sized NGOs, despite their proven track record of helping the
poor to be empowered in a sustainable manner.  
When asked, however, CIDA officials denied such criticisms by claiming that CIDA supports hun-
dreds of small and very small NGOs through the Canada Fund, the Gender Fund, and the
Environment Fund.83 According to another official, CIDA funds 53 small/medium NGO projects
each year. However, they turn down about 650 NGO applications for assistance since they do not
meet CIDA’s criteria and because CIDA has a limited budget and limited human resources to man-
age the concerned local fund mechanisms. He also suggested that those who failed to get funds from
CIDA were probably the ones that complained about CIDA’s bias toward large NGOs.84
CIDA’s concentration on the activities of large indigenous NGOs was explained by one official on
the grounds that: 
We support large NGOs primarily because they are efficient and reliable. These
NGOs know how to respond to our queries; they have the ability to manage
resources properly. They are also effective in delivering services to the poor within
the stipulated time.85
Another CIDA official also offered a similar viewpoint. “When assisting NGOs,” he suggested, “we
want to make sure that the NGO has an established mechanism through which it plans and manages
its development programs and it answers our questions”.86
In other words, CIDA’s continued interest in a few large and capable NGOs stems mainly from the
need to ensure an effective monitoring of its funding operations. Although such an explanation may
cast doubt on CIDA’s goal to “strengthen the capacity of NGOs and civil society groups in order to
enable communities to take their development into their own hands”,87 CIDA officials accept this
practice as a natural choice for the organization.  According to one CIDA officer: 
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Should this come as a surprise to anyone? And does this really cast doubt on CIDA’s
objectives in this area? The small and medium NGOs may not like it, but CIDA may
actually have got it right.88
The extensive politicization of Bangladesh’s civil society appears to have complicated CIDA’s poverty
reduction efforts in the country. A few large NGOs that receive funds from CIDA have become the
subject of growing political controversy in recent years. Instead of maintaining their traditional non-
partisan image, these NGOs have undertaken specific programs to support a particular political ide-
ology and/or political party. The results of such partisan behaviour have not only fragmented the
NGO sector, but also called into question the ability of these NGOs to protect the interests of the
beneficiaries of aid. 
Such a partisan political role, however, does not appear to have affected these NGOs’ relationship
with CIDA, as they have continued to receive CIDA funding for their programs, despite criticism by
other, non-partisan, NGOs. For instance, when speaking with us, an NGO executive expressed his
dissatisfaction over CIDA’s relationship with some more partisan NGOs by saying that: 
It is no secret that NGOs, such as Proshika, and ADAB have already become a plat-
form of a specific political party. We are very surprised that CIDA has not done any-
thing to review its traditional ties with these so-called NGOs.89
Local CIDA officials, however, responded to such criticisms by arguing that, “we support these
NGOs because of their ability to promote democratic development in Bangladesh. We have no proof
that they are affiliated with any political party”.90
Several respondents also raised questions about CIDA’s participatory development practices in
Bangladesh. Referring to the recently approved CPF, they criticized CIDA officials for not seeking
their views and inputs. Unlike other donors, such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and
the UK Department for International Development, which organize consultation meetings with dif-
ferent socio-political groups prior to the formulation of their country policies, CIDA’s Bangladesh
Programming Framework was prepared in the absence of consultation with any local partner. What
surprised this research team most was that almost all NGO leaders that we interviewed, including
representatives of BRAC, Proshika and ADAB, were not even aware of the adoption of the CPF for
Bangladesh.91
Bangladeshi NGOs also questioned the holding of consultation meetings with Canadian NGOs in
Ottawa. “It makes no sense for CIDA”, according to a local NGO representative, “to organize policy
dialogue with a group of people who know very little about our society, our culture, and our prob-




This report finds that Canada’s development cooperation policies in Bangladesh are broadly consis-
tent with its foreign policy objective of promoting sustainable development in different parts of
world, including Bangladesh.  As part of its twin global objectives of reducing global poverty and
ensuring prosperity and employment for Canada, various Canadian organizations, including CIDA
and DFAIT, are assisting Bangladesh to meet the complex challenges of poverty reduction. They
have focused their efforts on strengthening the institutional capacity of Bangladeshi government and
non-governmental organizations so that these organizations can improve their development per-
formance and their various contributions to poverty reduction. In association with other donor
organizations that are also working to improve the human condition and to accelerate economic
growth in Bangladesh, Canada is currently engaged in creating an enabling policy environment,
which is expected to allow entrepreneurs, both foreign and indigenous, to play a key role in the
country’s national economic development.
Our study observes that CIDA and DFAIT maintain close links with one another to protect
Canadian interests as well as to promote development in Bangladesh, while they tend to preserve
their organizational distinctiveness. Both establishments appear to have attached great value to the
promotion of organizational collaboration through formal and informal contacts and meetings.
They often make efforts to share information, knowledge and experience in order to develop com-
mon ground on various development issues. Despite this degree of institutional collaboration and
interaction between CIDA and DFAIT, key decisions are made and projects implemented in differ-
ent ways, often independently, in part reflective of their distinctive organizational mandates and
structures. While CIDA is primarily interested in having a greater impact on Bangladesh’s develop-
ment process, DFAIT seeks to widen Canada’s political and economic ties with the country.
Although these objectives are not necessarily incompatible, the absence of an integrated approach to
sustainable development and Canadian prosperity makes it difficult for Canada to effectively influ-
ence Bangladesh’s development initiatives, particularly poverty reduction efforts.
We find that the decision-making power is distributed disproportionately between CIDA head-
quarters and its officers in Bangladesh. The imbalance is clearly reflected in the absence of autonomy
for the local officials, who can make few decisions without the approval of headquarters. Such a cen-
tralized mechanism limits the power of local officials to respond positively to Bangladeshi needs and
priorities. In other words, the control of the decision-making power by CIDA headquarters creates
bureaucratic barriers to CIDA’s effective intervention in Bangladesh’s development process.  
This report calls attention to ways in which Canada promotes participatory development.  Although
it observes that CIDA and DFAIT attach some importance to promoting policy dialogue with vari-
ous non-state actors, this is usually limited to the discussion of various development issues. The
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existing consultation mechanisms in Ottawa hardly allow civil society groups, namely intermediary
NGOs, to play an active role in defining Canada’s position on, and vision of, sustainable human
development for Bangladesh. Similarly, the Canadian approach to the management and operation of
development initiatives does not give its partners, including the Government of Bangladesh, suffi-
cient space to set out how Canada might support their own development programs. 
Recommendations
For Canada to achieve greater coherence and a greater impact on Bangladesh’s poverty reduction
efforts, we make the following recommendations:
• If Canada desires a greater impact on Bangladesh’s development initiatives, it should consider the
adoption of an integrated Canadian approach to Bangladesh by combining CIDA’s CPF and
DFAIT’s policies and programs toward Bangladesh. It would be particularly useful for DFAIT to
take a special interest in complementing the goals of Canadian development cooperation in
Bangladesh, which remains the critical focal point of Canada’s relationship with Bangladesh.
Such an approach is also likely to allow CIDA to address more effectively the changing political
economy of Bangladesh, where there is an increasingly important need for shifting the focus from
direct poverty reduction efforts to improvements in the policy environment. Furthermore, an
integrated approach to Bangladesh’s poverty and development is also likely to contribute to the
further development of an institutional mechanism for enhanced collaboration between the activ-
ities of DFAIT and CIDA. 
• To increase consultation and collaboration with NGOs, civil society groups, CEAs and other
business companies, CIDA and DFAIT should jointly establish consultative bodies and/or advi-
sory committees both in Ottawa and in Dhaka.93 These consultative bodies may meet several
times a year, as needed, to achieve the following major purposes:
– to strengthen partnership arrangements between the  state and non-state actors;   
– to share and disseminate information 
– to produce analyses of major economic, social and political trends in Bangladesh and South
Asia 
– to promote coordinated action between the relevant Canadian government and non-
governmental organizations 
– to identify and assess inconsistencies between their programs, policies and preferences
– to explore further the concepts of “participatory development”, “sustainable human develop-
ment” and “social audit”
– to put forward recommendations in order to achieve greater policy coherence.
• To more actively and effectively influence Bangladesh’s development process, CIDA headquarters
should consider allowing its field officials to enjoy certain levels of autonomy (and decision-
making authority) to design and implement programs to meet Bangladesh’s crucial development
challenges and to respond effectively and quickly to local needs and priorities. Such flexibility
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would also allow local CIDA officials to ensure the optimal use of Canadian funds. In addition,
consultants, whether expatriate or local, who are working on CIDA projects, should be made
accountable to the Dhaka office. Not only should the local office have a say in the process of
appointing consultants, but the new method would allow field officials to monitor and supervise
consultants’ work, based on the guidelines set by headquarters.  
• CIDA should make more specific efforts to appreciate the diversity of the NGO community,
which has experienced phenomenal growth in Bangladesh in the last two decades, as this has
broader significance for CIDA’s development initiatives. In particular, CIDA needs to obtain a
more systematic and nuanced understanding of the crucial distinction between intermediary
NGOs that serve the interests of the government and/or a particular political party and those
which strive to advance the genuine cause of development. 
• To promote the concept of “participatory development”, CIDA should make a special effort to
enhance the involvement of its local partners, including the Government of Bangladesh and
indigenous NGOs, in designing and implementing development programs. Such an initiative may
enable its non-Canadian development partners to play a more active role in realizing the vision of
sustainable human development. 
• To further explore the emerging business opportunities for Canadian and Bangladeshi entrepre-
neurs in both Bangladesh and Canada, DFAIT may consider the adoption of a well-defined,
mutually beneficial trade and investment policy for Bangladesh. Such a policy not only would
enable Canadian companies to take advantage of Bangladesh’s increasingly liberalized trade and
investment regimes, but also it would help Bangladeshi business actors to find a more secure
place in the Canadian market. The expansion of Canada’s business ties with Bangladesh will
require, among other things, strengthening the capacity of Canada’s trade office in Dhaka, which
currently deals with some C$300 million in annual trade between Canada and Bangladesh. 
• Given Canada’s growing trade relationship with Bangladesh, DFAIT should consider the
appointment of a trade commissioner in Bangladesh to help Canadian and Bangladeshi traders
and investors to do business in both countries. For instance, this position could provide informa-
tion on the prospects for exports and investments in both countries; develop and maintain a
database to identify potential areas of business; and provide contacts with relevant business or
government organizations in both countries. It would also be able to monitor and report on any
constraints that inhibit trade and investment, whether at the policy level, or others such as weak
infrastructure or inadequate information.
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